in accordance with A's intention is made absolutely more attractive to B ... and not because other possibilities have been made less desirable." In contrast, a negative inducement is given "if action in accordance with A's intention, although no more attractive absolutely than before the change was made, is nevertheless more attractive relative to the other possibilities that now exist" (1, 2). All other courses of action are made more disadvantageous than the desired course, which is also somewhat disadvantageous.
Certain individuals and groups may wish to bargain, but they may lack the resources to do so-i.e., they may lack any stock of inducements (positive or negative) which they can use to influence other parties to act in accordance with at least some of their intentions. Others feel no need to bargain with these people. The question then becomes, how such a group (which I shall call the "excluded" group) can acquire a supply of compensations such that others will want to bargain. In the typical case, the excluded group is separated from others by differences in status, class, caste, or authority, and thus neither persuasion nor compulsion is available as a tactic of influence. Bargaining is not available because the excluded group has nothing the others desire, either in relation to the issue in point or to any future issue which might arise.
It is, of course, not sufficient that the excluded group have some compensations. The leaders of that group-the would-be bargainers-must show that they in fact control the resources and can "deliver" if they commit themselves. Negroes, for example, may represent customers or voters to businessmen and politicians, but if Negro leaders cannot alter the buying habits or switch the votes of their followers, the potential resources are useless. At this point, deception may become important. To the extent that Negro leaders are able to bargain at all, it is frequently a result of ignorance (or at least imperfect information) on the part of those with whom they are dealing. Since excluded groups (like Negroes) are often excluded precisely because of great status and class gaps, and because these gaps work to reduce information which each party has about the other, ignorance and deception can become very important factors in the strategy of Negro leadership.
Deception is of limited value, however, since it is easily exposed when the bargain is consummated. (It is nonetheless remarkable, the extent to which influence continues to be imputed to leaders of excluded groups even after their inability to deliver has been revealed. This may be a function of uncertainty as to their influence in future cases or a doubt as to whether the revealed failure was a valid test.)
Protest
The problem of many excluded groups is to create or assemble the resources for bargaining. Many often select a strategy of protest. Protest is distinguished from bargaining by the exclusive use of negative inducements (threats) that rely, for their effect, on sanctions which require mass action or response. Excluded groups often make up in number what they lack in resources, or their cause finds sympathizers among relatively large numbers of other groups. Bargaining might (as noted above) involve the use of negative inducements as compensation--i.e., a promise by one party not to act in a certain manner can be, relatively, a reward for the other party. This bargaining situation is based on protest only when these threats rely, for their effect, on the possibility of a mass response. The party against which the protest is directed values something which the excluded group can place in jeopardy. This could range from a certain reputation (which could be harmed by unfavorable publicity) to a business (which could be hurt by a boycott) and would include, in some cases, a desire to further some civic program without controversy.
There are various forms of protest action: verbal, physical, economic, and political. Verbal protest would include issuing denunciatory statements, mounting a campaign of adverse publicity, submitting petitions and memorials, holding mass meetings, and sending deputations to confront the other party. Physical protest would include picketing, sit-down strikes (as in places of business), "marches" (as the famous "March on Wash- The strategy of protest requires more than the possibility of mass action, however. First, there must be an agreed-upon goal on behalf of which mass action can be mobilized. Such goals may be either specific or general, defensive or assertive, welfare or status. The precise nature of the goal sought has important consequences for the kinds of incentives which can be distributed to generate and sustain mass action. A specific goal is more typical of successful protest (i.e., protest which in fact involved overt mass action and which thus created a situation with which other parties had to deal in some measure). The March on Washington Movement had the specific goal of securing the adoption of a fair employment practices law (or, failing that, an executive order to the same effect). The student sit-down strikes had the specific goal of inducing white proprietors to serve Negroes when seated at luncheon counters. Economic boycotts have the specific goal of inducing businessmen to hire Negroes or offer for sale products manufactured by companies which hire Negroes. At the same time, the specific goal is always related to a general, more vague principle. Each specific goal is the immediately sought application of some general notion concerning equality, opportunity, or status. This is essential, inasmuch as such principles -are an essential incentive with which to mobilize large numbers of contributors to the protest action. Few will benefit personally from the attainment of the specific goal; therefore, general reasons of an ethical character must be offered to attract the support of the many.
The offering of general reasons for specific goals is an important constraint on the leaders of protest movements. It usually means that the specific goal is endowed with a moral or sacrosanct quality which renders it difficult to compromise. This suggests that the discretion of the protest leader to bargain after he has acquired the resources with which to bargain is severely limited by the means he was forced to employ in order to create those resources. Getting into a bargaining relationship for a leader of an excluded group often means, therefore, a reduction in his ultimate ability to bargain. A second requisite exists for protest action. There must be an identifiable group or agency or firm which is capable of granting the end sought. There must, in a sense, be not only a specific goal, but a specific target. An opportunity for bargaining cannot be created when the target of protest action does not have it in its power to respond to the demands made. A secondary relationship might, of course, be found. Demands might be made by A upon B through a protest strategy even though B cannot satisfy these demands. It may nonetheless be a valuable strategy if C can grant these demands and C is in a bargaining relationship with B. B, in effect, can be compelled to become an intermediary and extract concessions from C (on the basis of an exchange of rewards which B and C value) which are then made available to A.
The target of protest action must not only be capable of responding; there must be some likelihood that he can be induced to respond. Responses to protest can be conceived of as a weighing of the probable costs of enduring the protest against the probable costs of making the concessions. The cost of being the target of protest action depends on the situation. For government officials and politicians (at least in the North) it may mean the loss of votes from Negroes or from sympathetic whites, criticism by articulate elements in the community, adverse effects on the opinion of foreign allies, and so on. For private parties (businessmen, unions, etc.) the costs would involve a deterioration in public relations, a possible loss of business, a fear of government intervention, a loss of manpower, and the exposure to controversy and unpleasantness. (It should be counted as a gain for protest that it might enable some parties to implement goals they feel ought to be realized with the rationale that they were "compelled" to do it and hence should not be criticized by opponents of the protest group.)
Limits of Negro Protest
It is clear to anyone who has investigated the matter even casually that there is today among Negroes, in both North and South, a quickened sense of mission and a rising level of expectations. More and more Negroes are expressing a deep discontent with their lot as individuals and as a group. The voices advocating "gradualism" and unhurried change have become fewer and fewer (even though the opinions behind these voices have not, in many cases, been altered). As the Negro has progressed, he has come to expect more and more in terms of equal treatment and improved conditions. Yet for all this heightened sense of urgency, relatively little in the way of Negro protest activity seems to occur. Negro organizations such as the NAACP continue to press legal suits seeking an expansion of opportunity, Second, the targets of protest action have become unclear or ambiguous. In issues where the exercise of specific public powers or the making of definite private decisions were clearly adapted to the ends sought, the target was obvious. The police could be asked for protection, the hotel required to admit Negro guests, the bus line requested to hire Negro drivers, or the legislature asked to pass a law. As the goals of protest action become broader and more general, the targets of that action become similarly diffuse. What is the target for protests aimed at "equal opportunity in housing?" One cannot picket, or boycott, or send deputations to all the real estate brokers, all the mortgage bankers, all the neighborhood improvement associations, or all the community newspapers. If one selects a single target-one house or one block in a certain neighborhood-one may gain concessions, but these concessions will be limited to the specific case and will represent no change in policy. Discriminatory practices in housing, in brief, are not the product of public or private decisions by some identifiable decision-maker. They are the result of an infinite number of social choices made by tens of thousands of home owners, landlords, realtors, bankers, loan officers, community groups, and individuals. Some practices undoubtedly can be curbed by legislation, but since the housing market involves many forces beyond legislative control (or any centralized control), laws would be of limited value. This is particularly the case if the goal is integrated housing and not simply more housing for Negroes. Individuals can be compelled to show that a refusal to sell to a Negro is not based on racial grounds, but they cannot be compelled to remain in the neighborhood and live side-by-side with the Negro.
Third, some of the goals now being sought by Negroes are, least applicable to those groups of Negroes most suited to protest action. Protest action involving such tactics as mass meetings, picketing, boycotts, and strikes rarely find enthusiastic participants among upper-income and higher-status individuals. Such strategies often require recruiting, through intangible appeals, lowerincome, lower-status groups that do not consider mass action beneath their dignity. This was not crucially important when the Negro community could respond, with nearunanimity, to indisputable outrages-when, in short, they sought specific, defensive, welfare ends. Many of the goals being sought today, such as access to desirable housing in middle-and upper-income neighborhoods and employment in supervisory, skilled, or professional jobs, do not involve rewards for groups not equipped, by income, training, or disposition, to avail themselves of such opportunities. Even when the goal can be made specific, it becomes difficult to mobilize the masses when (a) the end sought clearly benefits, at least immediately, only middle-and upper-class Negroes and (b) no general, principled rationale can be developed which will relate the specific goal to the aspirations or needs of the rankand-file. Indeed, as some recent cases suggest, there may be an actual conflict of ends between upper-status Negroes who seek access for their children to desirable white schools with high-quality instruction and the possibility of integrated living and, on the other hand, lower-status Negro parents who desire, simply, more schools and teachers even if they are all-Negro (6, 8) .
Fourth, many specific goals toward which action can be directed occur in situations that place a negative value on protest. For example, when (as happened in Chicago recently) a builder proposes constructing a tract of homes in a white community which will be sold to whites and Negroes on a non-discriminatory basis, an intense controversy is immediately precipitated. Whites offer resistance. A specific issue is at stakewill or will not the houses be built. In this case, Negro protest organizations often feel, with some justification, that mounting a protest campaign against the whites would only aggravate the situation and reduce the likelihood of getting the homes built by giving credence to white fears that the integrated homes are part of a "conspiracy" created by the NAACP and other Negro organizations to "force" Negroes into white areas. Similar problems arise when a single Negro family attempts to buy and occupy a home in a white neighborhood. Often public officials come to the conclusion that the family's chances of establishing itself are reduced if Negro protest is organized in its behalf. Inducing whites to accept one Negro family is difficult; inducing them to accept a family which the whites believe was "planted" by the NAACP and is, thus, the vanguard of a host of Negro families is much more difficult. To be sure, there are some Negro leaders who seize upon such explanations as a rationale for not doing what they have no taste for doing anyway. But in many cases the problem is genuine. Protest appears to be dysfunctional in just those cases where a specific goal exists to make protest possible at all.
Fifth, Negroes are not organized on a continuing basis for protest activity. The on-going voluntary associations to be found in a northern Negro community are almost always led by middle-class Negro business, professional, or church groups, with a sprinkling of labor leaders (10). These associations invariably lack a mass base. Even more important, those leaders who do command mass organizations are often under clear constraints to avoid protest tactics. At least two of the three principal Negro mass organizations (labor unions and political organizations) are part and parcel of city-wide unions and political groups. They derive the incentives used to maintain their organizations (jobs, patronage, appointments to staff positions, money, slating for office, etc.) from sources controlled by whites. Negro labor leaders and politicians tend to reflect the character of labor and political movements in the city as a whole. It is only when the labor or political groups of the city are weak, divided, or faltering that Negro leaders in these organizations can act with some independence. (This is the case in New York, for example, in the relationships between Tammany Hall and Harlem.) It becomes very difficult to organize political or economic protest movements that require strikes or switching votes. To attempt this would involve challenging established leaders in these fields. Even assuming such leaders could either be induced to protest or somehow bypassed, it is not at all clear that traditional voting allegiances could be overcome in a manner that would permit protest leaders to threaten realistically election reprisals against public officials.
This means that Negro protest leaders, in dealing with white politicians, often must employ deception or rely on imperfect information when they suggest that they speak "for" Negro voters. Surprisingly, many politicians can be influenced, at least marginally, in this way. Doubts exist, if not as to which way Negroes will vote, then as to the size of that vote. Hopes exist of improving one's individual position with Negro voters. But these are minor bargaining resources. Usually both sides realize that no organization exists which can switch any significant number of Negro voters in a predetermined manner.
Problems of Coordination
If these observations are correct, the prospects of vigorous, extensive, and organized Negro protest in large northern cities are poor. The danger confronting the Negro community in many places today is not extremism, but impotence. However, these conclusions regarding the logic and nature of protest do not cover all cases. Opportunities remain for this strategy, but these opportunities are of a limited character and present problems in themselves.
Protest action is best suited to situations in which the goal sought is defensive, specific, of a welfare character, relevant to the wants of the Negro rank-and-file, and has an explicit target. Such opportunities are found in greater number in the South than in the North today, but they are by no means absent in the North. Discriminatory practices are still to be found in many hotels, hospitals, restaurants, and places of employment. Existing voluntary associations in many, although not all, Negro communities are not absorbed in these tasks. Some approximation of this does, in fact, occur on occasion. The difficulty is that it places a great premium on coordination among Negro leaders and organizations. This coordination is rarely easy to obtain. First, the various leaders may not agree on what goals should be sought. The would-be bargainers, in a typical case, might very well find more Negro public housing an objectionable goal since it might easily result in the placing of lower-status Negroes in the neighborhoods of upper-status Negroes. Second, the protest association might well resist being "called off" for the price of a few housing units. This limited goal may not be sufficiently endowed with ideological significance to be the basis for mobilizing support for the campaign. The rank-andfile might feel that they were "sold out" by leaders who accepted such a concession rather than fighting the urban renewal project to the bitter end. The problem is to select a limited goal (so that there is some hope it can be obtained and so that it can plausibly be the subject of bargaining) and imbue it with enough significance so that it can provide incentives for action. Third, the protest and the bargaining groups would be radically different in character and thus find it difficult to work together comfortably. Each would be in competition with the other for scarce resources (personnel, contributions, publicity, etc.). Further, each would recruit members and leaders from different walks of life with differing temperaments and interests. There is no logical necessity that would prevent these twvo groups from coexisting peacefully and cooperating smoothly, but in fact cooperation (and sometimes even coexistence) seem impossible.
This raises a point about which Negro leaders themselves often speak. It is customary to assign to the NAACP and the Urban League, for example, distinctive roles and equal credit. Each has its function and each deserves support, one is told. One may prefer the League to the NAACP, but one recognizes the need for the other group. These amiable statements, however, often thinly conceal a great deal of tension between "League" types and "NAACP" types, particularly if (as is often the case) the leaders of the two organizations display strongly differing political styles (12). One group tends to be suspicious of the other. Normal organizational rivalries are intensified by tactical and temperamental differences. Suspicions are aroused about the motives and purposes of the other party. Cooperation becomes more difficult because one group has grave reservations about the ends and tactics of the other and thus finds a coordinated venture filled with uncertainties and possible risks.' 1 An apparent exception to the difficulty of coordinating protest action is the case of some Southern sit-in demonstrations. In cities such as Nashville, Tenn., and Montgomery, Ala., the spontaneous student sit-in strategy caused deep A strategy of secondary protest, with its attendant problem of coordination between two associations with differing end-and incentive-systems, points once again to the practical virtues of emphasizing narrow, specific goals with unambiguous targets. That such goals and such targets are to be found in abundance cannot be doubted. The immediate and tangible needs of Negroes, particularly for more and better jobs, are manifest. An argument can be made that increasing the net disposable income of a minority group is, over the long run, the best way to make possible those larger gains which seem to elude protest action at the moment. In part this can be justified concern among both white and "established" Negro leaders. The problem for the established Negro leaders (the lawyers, ministers, politicians, etc.) was to bargain with their white counterparts in order to gain some concessions in policies governing white lunch counters in return for ending the sit-in movement. Successful bargaining required that the Negro leaders be able to control the student demonstrators. In Nashville and other cities, when some agreement was reached, the sit-in strikes were in fact ended. This suggests a remarkable degree of coordination among Negro groups which, at the outset, were somewhat suspicious of one another and which had few common goals or common organizational memberships. I am told by certain Southern Negro leaders that the device by which the "established" Negro leaders acquired control over the student strikers was the bail money which the arrested students could not furnish themselves. In Montgomery, for example, a large sum was apparently collected by Negro leaders to use on behalf of student strikers. It is reported that when some students showed a reluctance to agree to tactical moves suggested by adult leaders, a withdrawal of this financial support was threatened. The threat proved effective in most cases. Some student leaders attempted to assert their independence with the slogan, "Jail, Not Bail," but did not command a large following when it became apparent that a jail sentence could be for as long as 30 or 60 days. 
Negro Protest in Chicago
That this is the case in at least one Northern city can be seen from an examination of seventeen issues involving Negroes in Chicago during the period 1958-60. These issues, the details of which are re-influence over public policy, although they exercised a great deal of unintended influence by being the objects of the concern of others. Thus, Negroes were important in the sense that others took their presence (but not their activity) into account in making decisions regarding, for example, whether and where to build a county hospital, a new school, or a housing project.
Few Negro-initiated proposals (such as FEPC or open occupancy housing laws) become public policy. Occasionally, Negroes were able to block the proposals of others. These "vetoes" were often effective, in such cases as the opposition to construction of a branch of the county hospital, because the simple act of raising the race issue injected sufficient controversy into the problem that it could not be easily disposed of by "civic leaders" who were anxious to maintain a non-controversial reputation (11).
Of the seventeen issues examined in Chicago, the problem was raised or created by whites and white groups acting on behalf of Negroes in three cases, by both Negroes and whites in seven cases, and by Negroes alone in seven cases. In nine cases, little or nothing resulted-i.e., Negro demands did not affect public policy or private actions. In four cases, minor changes were notedthe Mayor was interested in problems of private hospital discrimination, there was a slight improvement in police protection in Negro areas, there appeared to be a slight lessening of police maltreatment of Negroes, and relocation procedures in urban renewal were improved. In four other cases, there was a clear impact on public policy-a shake-up occurred in a district police station in order to intensify narcotics investigation, a new vocational school was constructed, the building of a county hospital branch was delayed significantly, and some Negroes were hired in a downtown bank.
Several aspects of these limited successes are of interest. First, the ends successfully attained rested for the most part on demands for public services or minimal standards of justice that are difficult for whites to deny publicly or reject. They seemed to be demands for things that any citizen is entitled to as a matter of obvious principle. Although neither the NAACP nor the Urban League was indifferent to these matters, for a variety of reasons they tended to stay out of them. In the police and bank cases, the issue seemed to be in the hands of people of uncertain reputation, lowerclass backgrounds, or dubious motives. In the other cases, the established voluntary associations were divided as to ends or tactics and hence constrained from acting vigorously.
It has been frequently observed that these on-going Negro organizations lack the capacity for mass leadership. Indeed, that is a continuing theme of Negro criticism against them ( 
The Meaning of Apathy
Many Negroes and some whites frequently comment on the lack of "Negro leadership." The absence of effective Negro civic leadership is usually ascribed to apathy, indifference, or conservatism. Such "explanations" actually explain very little. They are, for the most part, merely another way of stating the problem. In this paper I have suggested that the apparent absence of concerted protest action among northern Negroes can be accounted for by the nature of the ends sought, the diffusion of relevant targets, the differentiation of the Negro community along class lines, and the organizational constraints placed on Negroes as they enter into partial contact with the white community. If these factors, rather than "apathy" or "Uncle Tomism" provide a plausible explanation, then additional research is called for into the manner in which the relationship between ostensible ends, organizational constraints, and social stratification will vary among Negro communities. The task would be to uncover the variations which exist between stated goals and existing incentives for action toward those goals in a number of cities.
Preliminary research (12) suggests that the reason for the higher level of protest activity among New York Negroes as compared to those in Chicago is that the formal and informal political leaders and the officers of prestige-conferring voluntary associations in New York feel they must reward, as a result of their own maintenance needs, vigorous Negro leaders. Negroes protest more in New York because the desired outcome of protest (i.e., entering into a bargaining relationship with the other party) is much more likely than in, say, Chicago. In turn, this outcome is more likely because target organizations in New York have a greater need for the compensations which Negro protest leaders can offer-a cessation of public criticism and controversy. To explain why these compensations are valued more in one city than another would take us too far afield here; the example is offered only to show the possible lines of theoretical and empirical research which emerge out of an examination of protest as a civic strategy.
